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**BLUE GOAT CYBER**

Medical Device Cybersecurity · FDA Specialists

EU MDR & IVDR CYBERSECURITY GUIDE

# EU MDR & IVDR Cybersecurity Guide

MDR Annex I, IVDR, MDCG 2019-16, and the  
Cyber Resilience Act - plus a harmonized  
FDA + EU submission package.

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EU MARKET ACCESS

# EU MDR & IVDR cybersecurity guide.

EU MDR (2017/745) and IVDR (2017/746) embed cybersecurity directly into the General Safety and Performance Requirements. **MDCG 2019-16 Rev.1** is the de-facto guidance Notified Bodies use, and the **Cyber Resilience Act** adds horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. If you're filing FDA + CE in parallel, you can build one evidence package that satisfies both - if you plan it that way.

**Key takeaway:** Notified Bodies are increasingly asking for the same artifacts FDA reviewers want - SBOM, threat model, pen test, postmarket plan. A harmonized package saves months of duplicated work.

## 1. MDR Annex I §17.2 + IVDR Annex I §16.4 - the core requirements

<b>State of the art</b>	Devices with software shall be designed against the state of the art for IT security.
<b>Minimum IT environment</b>	Manufacturer specifies the minimum hardware, network, and security characteristics needed.
<b>Protection by design</b>	Protection against unauthorized access required by design - not bolted on.
<b>Lifecycle risk management</b>	Repeatable, verifiable cybersecurity risk management throughout the lifecycle.

## 2. MDCG 2019-16 Rev.1 - the operative guidance

- **Security risk management** integrated with ISO 14971.
- **Secure design and manufacture** - analogous to FDA's SPDF.
- **Security verification and validation** expectations (incl. pen testing).
- **Postmarket surveillance, incident reporting, and updates.**
- **IT security capabilities** communicated to operators (analogous to MDS<sup>2</sup>).

## 3. Cyber Resilience Act - what's coming

<b>Scope</b>	Horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements placed on the EU market.
<b>Vulnerability handling</b>	Mandatory CVD process and ENISA notification of actively exploited vulnerabilities.

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<b>Security updates</b>	Free security updates throughout the expected product lifetime.
<b>Conformity assessment</b>	Important / critical product classes require third-party assessment.
<b>Lex specialis</b>	MDR/IVDR carve-outs are still being clarified - assume some overlap, plan for both.

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## 4. Notified Body evidence pack

- Cybersecurity risk assessment integrated with ISO 14971 risk file.
- SBOM (CycloneDX 1.5 + VEX preferred).
- Threat model with mitigations traced to design controls.
- Penetration test report - manual, exploit-driven, not just scanner output.
- Postmarket surveillance plan with vulnerability monitoring and CVD policy.
- User-facing security documentation (analogous to MDS<sup>2</sup>).
- Software lifecycle process evidence (IEC 62304 + IEC 81001-5-1).

## 5. FDA vs. EU - side-by-side evidence requirements

<b>SBOM</b>	FDA: machine-readable required. EU/MDCG: expected; CRA will mandate. Same artifact works.
<b>Threat model</b>	FDA: STRIDE-per-element + AAMI TIR57. EU: ISO/IEC 62443-4-1 patterns. Same model, mapped both ways.
<b>Pen test</b>	FDA: manual, exploit-driven. EU: same expectation under IEC 81001-5-1. Same report works.
<b>Postmarket / CVD</b>	FDA: 524B + 2026 guidance. EU: MDCG 2019-16 + CRA. Same program, two policy references.
<b>Labeling</b>	FDA: cybersecurity labeling for end users. EU: IT security capabilities for operators. Aligned via MDS <sup>2</sup> .

## 6. Harmonized FDA + EU submission architecture

- **One canonical SBOM** (CycloneDX 1.5) - referenced by both submissions.
- **One threat model** with two annexes mapping to FDA and MDCG terminology.
- **One pen test report** with executive summaries tailored to each regulator.
- **One postmarket / CVD policy** citing FDA 524B + ISO/IEC 29147/30111 + MDCG.
- **One labeling/MDS<sup>2</sup> set** updated in lockstep when posture changes.

## 7. Common Notified Body deficiency themes

- Cybersecurity risk not integrated with ISO 14971 - treated as a separate file.
- No evidence of pen testing by qualified independent testers.

- Postmarket plan reads as policy, not a working process.
- User documentation missing IT environment requirements.
- IEC 81001-5-1 process gaps - especially activity records and traceability.

**Key takeaway:** If you're entering EU and US markets, design the evidence package once, with both audiences in mind. Retrofitting a US-only package for CE adds months.

READY FOR THE NEXT STEP?

## Talk to a senior medical device security engineer.

We've contributed cybersecurity documentation, threat models, SBOMs, and pen test reports to **250+ FDA submissions** across 510(k), De Novo, and PMA pathways - with a **100% submission success rate**. If you're building a cyber device and want to go in with airtight artifacts on the first try, we should talk.

### Book an EU + FDA harmonization session

30 minutes. No slide deck. Bring your device profile and your top three questions.

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### WHAT WE DO

- **FDA premarket cybersecurity** - SPDF, threat model, SBOM, pen test, security risk assessment, eSTAR-ready package
- **FDA cybersecurity deficiency response** - rapid remediation when reviewers send a letter
- **Postmarket programs** - vulnerability monitoring, VEX, coordinated disclosure, patch validation
- **Legacy device remediation** - bring older devices up to current FDA expectations